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If we are to speak with strictest accuracy, there is no such thing as an
"easement in gross" . . . since an easement presupposes two distinct tene-
ments, one dominant, the other servient. . . .[Courts, however, have recog-
nized] the sort of mere personal, nonassignable, noninheritable privilege or
license sometimes loosely described as an "easement in gross."'
In this country such privileges have sometimes been spoken of as li-
censes, or as contractual in their nature, rather than as easements in gross.
1. Loch Sheldrake Assocs. v. Evans, 306 N.Y. 297, 304, 118 N.E.2d 444, 447 (1954)
(citations omitted).
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These are differences of terminology rather than of substance . . . There
does not seem to be any reason why the law should prohibit the assignment
of an easement in gross if the parties to its creation evidence their intention
to make it assignable.2
I. INTRODUCTION
As the above statements indicate, courts have disagreed about
the nature, obligations, and privileges that accompany the ease-
ment in gross. Generally, an easement is an interest in land which
gives the easement holder the right to use that land for a specific
purpose, free from the will of the landowner.3 An easement is in
gross when the benefit from the use of another's land inures to the
easement holder personally, rather than to the holder's land.4 The
land that is subject to the holder's right of use is the servient tene-
ment.5 Courts agree on these basic principles of an easement in
gross, but have disagreed on the holder's right to transfer his inter-
est to a third party. Similarly, no uniformity exists among courts
on the right of the holder of an easement in gross to divide and
share his interest with a third party.
In the mid-1940's, two commentators compiled and analyzed
the state of the law concerning the transferability and divisibility
of easements in gross." Both writers attested to the importance of
easements in gross in facilitating commercial activity, especially in
the area of transportation rights of way and public utilities. Each
author noted that the common law rule disfavored transferability
and divisibility of easements in gross because the rights accompa-
nying the easement were personal to the holder." The two writers
noted, however, that the common law rule was beginning to change
and that courts were allowing limited transfers and divisions of
easements in gross.' Emphasizing that a party could not realize the
maximum value of an easement in gross unless the courts allowed
2. Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Ass'n, 331 Pa. 241, 249-50, 200 A. 646, 651
(1938).
3. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 450 (1944).
4. See 3 R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 405, at 34-22 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as POWELL & ROHAN].
5. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 455.
6. See Kloek, Assignability and Divisibility of Easements in Gross, 22 CHL-KENT L.
REV. 239 (1944); Welsh, The Assignability of Easements in Gross, 12 U. CHL L. REV. 276
(1945).
7. See Kloek, supra note 6, at 239-40; Welsh, supra note 6, at 276-77. Mr. Welsh was a
division attorney for American Telephone and Telegraph Co.
8. See Kloek, supra note 6, at 241-45; Welsh, supra note 6, at 276-78.
9. See Kloek, supra note 6, at 245-52, 255-56; Welsh, supra note 6, at 280-81.
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the easement holder to transfer or divide his interest,10 both men
concluded their essays with a call for a greater consensus among
the courts and for fewer restrictions on the transferability and di-
visibility of easements in gross."
These commentaries appeared over forty years ago. Today,
easements in gross continue to play an important commercial role12
and are finding new uses in fields such as environmental conserva-
tion and historic preservation.' 3 Despite the growing importance of
easements in gross, commentators during this forty-year span have
neglected to address the questions of transferability and divisibil-
ity. The purpose of this Note is to gather and analyze the law of
transferability and divisibility of easements in gross as the law has
developed since 1945. Part II of this Note differentiates easements
in gross from other types of real servitudes. Part III discusses the
variety of approaches that courts and legislatures have taken in
addressing the question of transferability. Part IV deals with the
development of the independent exercise doctrine of divisibility.
Last, part V advocates that courts should place less emphasis on
terminology and should direct more attention toward the parties'
intentions and the surrounding circumstances of the easement in-
terest when determining the transferability and divisibility of ease-
ments in gross.
II. DIFFERENTIATING EASEMENTS IN GROSS FROM SIMILAR
SERVITUDES
A. Easements Appurtenant
The second major type of easement is the easement appurte-
nant. "' Like the easement in gross, the easement appurtenant gives
the holder the right to use another's land for a specific purpose
without interference from the landowner.' An easement appurte-
nant, however, differs from an easement in gross in that the benefit
from the right inures to the holder's land and becomes attached
(i.e., appurtenant) to that land.'6 The holder's land is the domi-
10. See Kloek, supra note 6, at 258-59.
11. See id. at 258-60; Welsh, supra note 6, at 283-84.
12. See infra notes 53-69 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 92-116 and accompanying text. For a full discussion of the modem
role of easements, see generally 3 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 4, 414.
14. See 3 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 4, 405, at 34-18 to -22.
15. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 450.
16. See 3 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 4, 2405, at 34-20; 2 G. THOMPSON, COMMENTA-
RIES ON THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 321 (J. Grimes 1980 repl.).
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nant tenement and the holder exercises his easement rights on the
servient tenement.17 Courts usually require that the dominant and
servient tenements be located near each other, if not adjacent.18
Traditionally, courts have allowed the transfer of an easement ap-
purtenant when the easement holder transfers his dominant es-
tate.19 In allowing the transfer, many courts reason that an ease-
ment appurtenant has no existence separate from the dominant
estate.2
B. Easements of Necessity
The easement of necessity is a specialized type of easement
appurtenant.2 1 When, for instance, a parcel of land is landlocked,
courts will provide a right of way for the dominant tenement by
creating an easement of necessity for ingress and egress. The ease-
ment of necessity becomes appurtenant to the landlocked parcel.
Consequently, the easement of necessity, like the easement appur-
tenant, follows the dominant tenement when the holder transfers
his land.22
C. Profits a Prendre
A profit a prendre, like an easement in gross, gives the holder
personal rights in another's land for certain uses, free from the will
of the servient owner.2 3 The historical distinction between ease-
ments in gross and profits a prendre arises out of the type of use
to which the holder can subject the servient estate. As the name
17. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 456 & comment a.
18. See 3 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 4, 405, at 34-20 to -21 & n.33; 2 G. THOMP-
SON, supra note 16, § 322, at 72-73.
19. See, e.g., St. Louis v. DeBon, 204 Cal. App. 2d 464, 466, 22 Cal. Rptr. 443, 444
(1962) (stating that an easement appurtenant can pass with the dominant tenement without
specific mention in the instrument); Passaic Valley Council Boy Scouts of Am. v. Hartwood
Syndicate, 46 A.D.2d 247, 249, 361 N.Y.S.2d 945, 947 (1974) (observing that an easement
appurtenant is transferred with the dominant tenement); 2 G. THOMPSON, supra note 16,
§ 322, at 67 & n.16.
20. See, e.g., Williams v. Stirling, 40 Colo. App. 463, 466-67, 583 P.2d 290, 292-93
(1978) (holding that easement appurtenant for ski trails depended on dominant tenement
for existence); Hall v. Meyer, 270 Or. 335, 339, 527 P.2d 722, 724 (1974) (easement appurte-
nant for water rights to spring did not exist separately from dominant tenement); Roggow v.
Hagerty, 27 Wash. App. 908, 913, 621 P.2d 195, 197 (1980) (despite failure to mention exis-
tence of easement appurtenant for right of way in deed, easement was conveyed as part of
dominant tenement); 2 G. THOMPSON, supra note 16, § 322, at 67 & n.16.
21. See J. CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 268 (1962).
22. See, e.g., Horowitz v. Noble, 79 Cal. App. 3d 120, 130, 144 Cal. Rptr. 710, 718
(1978).
23. See 1 G. THOMPSON, supra note 16, § 139.
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indicates, a profit is the right to remove a part of the servient es-
tate, usually for commercial purposes. 24 Examples of profits are
mining, oil and gas, and timber interests."' The Restatement of
Property classifies profits a prendre as easements in gross. 26
Courts, however, usually consider easements in gross and profits as
separate and distinct servitudes that demand different analyses on
the issue of transferability.27 Courts generally acknowledge the
transferability of the profit a prendre.28
III. TRANSFERABILITY
A. The Long Shadow of Ackroyd
Traditionally, courts held that because easements in gross
were personal to the holder, the holder could never transfer 9 his
easements rights to another party. If the easement holder at-
tempted a transfer, the rights in gross would not survive. The
transferee would acquire no rights and the servient tenement
would no longer carry the easement burden. American courts de-
rived this rule from an early English case, Ackroyd v. Smith,30 in
which an easement holder attempted to transfer a right of way
across a neighboring parcel of land. In denying the transferee's
right to cross his neighbor's land, the court stated: "If a way be
granted in gross, it is personal only, and cannot be assigned." 1
Subsequent courts refused to limit Ackroyd to easements of pas-
sage and the case came to stand for the general principle of the
nontransferability of easements in gross.2 Because the influence of
Ackroyd still persists,3 3 courts must recognize and overcome the
24. See id.; 3 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 4, 1 405, at 34-14 to -16.
25. See 1 G. THOMPSON, supra note 16, § 135.
26. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 450 special note & comments f and g.
27. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 48.
29. Throughout this Note, "transfer" of an easement connotes passing the rights of
the easement by assignment or inheritance.
30. 138 Eng. Rep. 68 (1850).
31. Id. at 77. The court recognized the validity of the easement in gross between the
original parties, but held that rights in gross "cannot be granted over." Id. The court viewed
the attempted transfer between the original holder and his transferee as a creation of a
"new species of burthen" on the servient owner's land, rather than a continuation of the
original holder's rights. Id.
32. See Welsh, supra note 6, at 277.
33. Commentators have long criticized the persistence of Ackroyd in American juris-
dictions. See, e.g., id. and cases cited therein; Kloek, supra note 6, at 244 and cases cited
therein; Simes, The Assignability of Easements in Gross in American Law, 22 MICH. L. REV.
521 (1924) and cases cited therein.
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Ackroyd restriction to deal realistically with the current role of the
easement in gross.
The remainder of part III will discuss the variety of ap-
proaches that courts and legislatures have taken to overcome the
Ackroyd restraint on the transferability of easements in gross. The
most conservative approach is simply to reclassify the interest at
issue as a servitude that is transferable. A more straightforward
approach, which has been developing since World War II, is to de-
termine transferability according to the commercial or noncom-
mercial nature of the easement in gross. A third approach, which is
potentially the most far reaching, is to base transferability of the
easement partly on the intent of the parties. Finally, this section
will explore the statutory approach to transferability through the
example of conservation easement acts.
B. An Easement in Gross by Any Other Name
Since 1945, many courts faced with decisions concerning the
transferability of easements in gross have sidestepped the Ackroyd
restraint on transferability. 4 These courts have chosen to avoid
the issue by attaching to the interest the name of another real ser-
vitude that is transferable. Courts primarily choose the easement
appurtenant to counter the Ackroyd limitation on transferability
of an easement in gross. The law consistently has allowed the
transfer of easements appurtenant because courts consider them to
be an inseparable part of the holder's land. 5 A conveyance of the
easement holder's land, therefore, carries the easement appurte-
nant, just as the land would carry a house or a fence.
In view of the relatively straightforward rules that allow trans-
fer of easements appurtenant, many courts have established a legal
presumption that an easement is appurtenant rather than in
gross.3 6 This presumption against easements in gross is so strong
34. These courts usually begin their easement analysis by restating the Ackroyd rule.
See, e.g., Martin v. Ray, 76 Cal. App. 2d 471, 478-79, 173 P.2d 573, 578 (1946); Jeffers v.
Toschlog, 178 Ind. App. 603, 605, 383 N.E.2d 457, 458-59 (1978); Von Meding v. Strahl, 319
Mich. 598, 610, 30 N.W.2d 363, 369 (1948); Loch Sheldrake Assocs. v. Evans, 306 N.Y. 297,
304, 118 N.E.2d 444, 447 (1954); Nemmer Furniture Co. v. Select Furniture Co., 25 Misc. 2d
895, 899, 208 N.Y.S.2d 51, 56 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Shingleton v. State, 260 N.C. 451, 454, 133
S.E.2d 183, 185 (1963); Lester Coal Corp. v. Lester, 203 Va. 93, 97, 122 S.E.2d 901, 904
(1961).
35. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Continental Baking Co. v. Katz, 68 Cal. 2d 512, 523, 439 P.2d 889, 896, 67
Cal. Rptr. 761, 768 (1968); Schofield v. Bany, 175 Cal. App. 2d 534, 537, 346 P.2d 891, 893
(1959); Barton v. Gammell, 143 Ga. App. 291, 294, 238 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1977); Martin v.
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that a few courts have labeled easements as appurtenant that were
unambiguously rights in gross.3 7 For example, most courts consider
utility easements to be in gross; 8 nevertheless, because of the pre-
sumption against easements in gross, some courts have held utility
easements to be appurtenant."
Connecticut is the only state that has a presumption in favor
of easements in gross. 40 Because easements in gross are considered
nontransferable, the Connecticut presumption operates as a pre-
sumption against transferability. The Connecticut presumption,
however, has not been strong. In states that have a presumption in
Music, 254 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Ky. 1953); Murphy v. Mart Realty of Brockton, Inc., 348 Mass.
675, 678, 205 N.E.2d 222, 225 (1965); County of Johnson v. Weber, 160 Neb. 432, 438, 70
N.W.2d 440, 445 (1955); White Cap Sea Foods, Inc. v. Panzner, 2 Misc. 2d 421, 424, 148
N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Nolan v. Bender, 42 Ohio Law Abs. 441, 448, 61 N.E.2d 628,
632 (1944); Hall v. Meyer, 270 Or. 335, 339, 527 P.2d 722, 724 (1974); Rusciolelli v. Smith,
195 Pa. Super. 562, 569, 171 A.2d 802, 806 (1961); Lynn v. Turpin, 187 Tenn. 384, 388, 215
S.W.2d 794, 796 (1948); Kemery v. Mylroie, 8 Wash. App. 344, 346, 506 P.2d 319, 320 (1973)
(quoting Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co. v. Seattle Constr. and Dry Dock Co., 102 Wash. 608,
618, 173 P. 508, 511 (1918)); Delgue v. Curutchet, 677 P.2d 208, 212 (Wyo. 1984). Welsh
noted in 1945 that this presumption was "almost universally the rule." Welsh, supra note 6,
at 280.
37. One court held that an easement for a right of way was appurtenant and transfera-
ble, not in gross, even though the original instrument reserved to the grantor the right "'to
personally have the privilege of ingress and egress'" across the grantee's land. Todd v.
Nobach, 368 Mich. 544, 549, 118 N.W.2d 402, 405 (1962) (emphasis added). Another court
allowed the transfer of easement rights to use a spring as an appurtenant interest, even
though the original instrument specified no dominant tenement. Leggio v. Haggerty, 231
Cal. App. 2d 873, 878-81, 42 Cal. Rptr. 400, 403-04 (1965). Another court held that the right
to use an outside stairway on one building to reach the second floor of a neighboring build-
ing was an easement appurtenant. But, illustrating how far a court will take the presump-
tion beyond its usefulness, the court went on to hold that the right died with the original
grantee. Warren v. Brenner, 89 Ohio App. 188, 194, 196, 101 N.E.2d 157, 161 (1950).
38. See infra text accompanying note 65.
39. See, e.g., Martin, 254 S.W.2d at 703 (easement for sewer lines); Weber, 160 Neb. at
439, 70 N.W.2d at 445 (easement for drainage levee); American Reiter Co. v. Dinallo, 53 N.J.
Super. 388, 392, 147 A.2d 290, 292-93 (1959) (easement for sewer line); Winsten v. Prichard,
23 Wash. App. 428, 431, 597 P.2d 415, 416 (1979) (general "utilities" easement).
Courts have held other rights, which the majority of courts would consider rights in
gross, to be easements appurtenant. See, e.g., Smith v. Hill, 237 Cal. App. 2d 374, 47 Cal.
Rptr. 49 (1965) (easement for stockpiling gravel); Barton, 143 Ga. App. 291, 238 S.E.2d 445
(recreational easement); Kemery, 8 Wash. App. 344, 506 P.2d 319 (right of way easement
not touching holder's land).
40. The absence of the words "heirs and assigns" in the instrument raises the pre-
sumption. See Kelly v. Ivler, 187 Conn. 31, 39-40, 450 A.2d 817, 821 (1982); Leabo v. Lenin-
ski, 182 Conn. 611, 614, 438 A.2d 1153, 1155 (1981); Dunn Bros., Inc. v. Lesnewsky, 164
Conn. 331, 335, 321 A.2d 453, 455 (1973); Birdsey v. Kosienski, 140 Conn. 403, 410, 101 A.2d
274, 277-78 (1953). But see Burcky v. Knowles, 120 N.H. 244, 247, 413 A.2d 585, 589 (1980)
(holding that lack of words of transferability in original easement reservation did not raise a
presumption in favor of an easement in gross); Glines v. Auger, 93 N.H. 340, 341, 42 A.2d
219, 220 (1945) (same).
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favor of easements appurtenant, the presumption usually with-
stands rebuttal, and the easement is transferred.4' In Connecticut,
the presumption in favor of easements in gross has not withstood
rebuttal; consequently, Connecticut courts often find that the ease-
ment is appurtenant and allow the transfer.42
A second type of real servitude on which the courts rely to
avoid the Ackroyd restriction on transferring easements in gross is
the easement of necessity.43 The Maine Supreme Court, for exam-
ple, created an easement of necessity in LeMay v. Anderson,"
which allowed the parties to transfer a contested interest. The de-
fendant's predecessor in title transferred to the defendant an ease-
ment right to cross plaintiff's land. The court held that the ease-
ment was in gross to the defendant's predecessor in title and
therefore not transferable.45 The court, however, created an ease-
ment of necessity that followed the same route as the original ease-
ment.46 Thus, the court, merely changed the name of the contested
interest and left the parties in the same relation as before the
action.
Last, some courts. have been able to avoid the issue of the
transferability of easements in gross by associating the interest
with the profit a prendre.4  For many years, the common law has
41. See supra notes 36-39 and accompanying text.
42. The Connecticut courts proceed with a careful rebuttal analysis examining (1) the
intent of the parties, (2) the value of the property with or without the easement, (3) the
servient owner's recognition of the right of the original holder's successor to use the ease-
ment, and (4) the language of the creating instrument. See Kelly, 187 Conn. at 42-45, 450
A.2d at 822-23; Leabo, 182 Conn. at 614-15, 438 A.2d at 1155; Dunn Bros., 164 Conn. at 335-
36, 321 A.2d at 455; Birdsey, 140 Conn. at 410-12, 101 A.2d at 277-78.
43. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
44. 397 A.2d 984 (Me. 1979).
45. Id. at 986. The court held that the easement was in gross even though the creating
instrument reserved the easement rights "'to grantor and others.'"
46. Id. at 987-89. The landlocked parcel in LeMay was next to a lake, and the express
easement ran across the neighboring land to the highway. The original servient tenement
owner was the son-in-law of the original owners of the parcel by the lake. When the son-in-
law sold his land to defendants, he expressly reserved an easement across it for the benefit
of his parents-in-law. Id. at 986. Although the son-in-law did not use the easement, the
court said that the easement was personal to him and could not be quitclaimed to plaintiffs,
successors of the parents-in-law. Id.; see also Solana Land Co. v. Murphey, 69 Ariz. 117, 122,
123-25, 210 P.2d 593, 596, 597-99 (1949) (implying an easement of necessity to a section of
land along same route over which land's developers had acquired a nontransferable ease-
ment in gross).
47. See, e.g., Costa v. Fawcett, 202 Cal. App. 695, 699-703, 21 Cal. Rptr. 143, 146-48
(1962) (right to enter land to tend trees and harvest walnuts); Beckwith v. Rossi, 157 Me.
532, 534, 175 A.2d 732, 734 (1961) (right to enter land and take gravel); Hanson v. Fergus
Falls Nat'l Bank, 242 Minn. 498, 503, 65 N.W.2d 857, 861 (1954) (right to hunt on land).
In Hanson the original grant of hunting rights was to grantee, "'his heirs and assigns,
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recognized that profits a prendre are transferable. 8 The distinc-
tion between the personal benefit of the easement in gross and the
profit is minimal. The Restatement and some commentators actu-
ally classify the profit as a type of easement in gross.49 One court,
for example, upheld defendant's claim that he inherited the right
to remove sand and gravel from plaintiff's land.5° The court la-
beled the interest an easement in gross, 51 after noting that the dif-
ference between the legal characteristics of a profit a prendre and
an easement in gross was "microscopic. 52
C. The Commercial/Noncommercial Distinction
1. Commercial Easements in Gross
Courts originally allowed the transfer of profits a prendre, in
part, because the right to remove a portion of the servient estate
had an obvious commercial value. As the easement in gross
gained commercial popularity, some courts reconsidered the
Ackroyd rule prohibiting the transfer of easements in gross and
began to condition transferability of easements in gross on the
commercial nature of the easement. 54 The Pennsylvania court's de-
cision in Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Association55 was
a catalyst for this trend. The Miller court allowed the transfer of
an easement in gross for boating, fishing, and bathing rights on an
artificial lake.56 Emphasizing the commercial nature of the ease-
ment, the court held that commercial easements in gross are trans-
ferable and that noncommercial easements in gross are
forever.'" 242 Minn. at 500, 65 N.W.2d at 859. The trial court held that the grant was an
easement in gross and assignable. Id. at 503, 65 N.W.2d at 861. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court affirmed the assignee's right to hunt, but in different terms:
While the trial court found that plaintiff had an easement, we need not determine
whether we will follow the rule that easements in gross are nonassignable ... for the
reason that we are already committed to the rule that the interest which plaintiff has,
if any, is a profit a prendre in gross, not an easement in gross, strictly speaking.
Id.
48. See 1 G. THOMPSON, supra note 16, § 137; C. TIEDEMAN, AN ELEMENTARY TREATISE
ON THE AMERICAN LAW OP REAL PROPERTY §§ 587, 591 (1st ed. 1885); 2 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW
oF REAL PROPERTY § 382 (2d ed. 1920).
49. See supra text accompanying notes 23-27.
50. Moore v. Schultz, 22 N.J. Super. 24, 91 A.2d 514 (App. Div. 1952), aff'd per
curiam, 12 N.J. 329, 96 A.2d 732 (1953).
51. Id. at 30-31, 91 A.2d at 517.
52. Id. at 28, 91 A.2d at 516.
53. See 1 G. THOMPSON, supra note 16, § 139.
54. Welsh noted this trend in 1945. See Welsh, supra note 6, at 281.
55. 331 Pa. 241, 200 A. 646 (1938).
56. Id. at 247-48, 200 A. at 648, 650.
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nontransferable.
Other courts have followed Miller's lead in allowing the trans-
fer of private commercial easements in gross.5 8 South Carolina, in
Sandy Island Corp. v. Ragsdae,5 9 relied on Miller in formulating a
test that distinguished between commercial and noncommercial
easements in gross.60 The Sandy Island court held that an ease-
ment in gross whose use "results primarily in economic benefit
rather than personal satisfaction" is commercial and is therefore
transferable. 1 Since 1944, the Restatement has recognized that
commercial easements in gross are transferable "as a matter of
law."'6 2 The Restatement drafters desired that interests in property
maintain a "high degree of alienability. 6 3
Courts readily acknowledge the distinction between commer-
cial and noncommercial easements in gross when evaluating
whether to permit the transfer of public commercial easements in
gross. Public commercial easements include those held by govern-
mental units 4 and public utilities. 5 In addition to the policy that
57. The court stated: "[T]here is an obvious difference . . . between easements for
personal enjoyment and those designed for commercial exploitation; while there may be lit-
tle justification for permitting assignments in the former case, there is every reason for up-
holding them in the latter." Id. at 250, 200 A. at 651.
58. See, e.g., Buehler v. Oregon-Washington Plywood Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 520, 528, 551
P.2d 1226, 1231, 131 Cal. Rptr. 394, 399 (1976) (easement for hauling timber across right of
way); Collier v. Oelke, 202 Cal. App. 2d 843, 847, 21 Cal. Rptr. 140, 141-42 (1962) (easement
for drainage pipeline for farming operation); Schnabel v. County of DuPage, 101 Ill. App. 3d
553, 557, 428 N.E.2d 671, 678 (1981) (right of way easement transferred from one railroad to
another); Moore v. Schultz, 22 N.J. Super. 24, 26-27, 30-31, 91 A.2d 514, 515, 517 (App. Div.
1952), aff'd per curiam, 12 N.J. 329, 96 A.2d 732 (1953) (easement for commercial removal
of sand and gravel); Sunset Lake Water Serv. Dist. v. Remington, 45 Or. App. 973, 977, 609
P.2d 896, 899 (1980) (easement for right of private company to lay water line for city). But
see, e.g., Williams v. Stirling, 40 Colo. App. 463, 466, 583 P.2d 290, 292-93 (1978) (easements
for ski trails were commercial, therefore appurtenant).
59. 246 S.C. 414, 143 S.E.2d 803 (1965). The easement in Sandy Island was for a right
of way to transport timber.
60. Id. at 422, 143 S.E.2d at 808.
61. Id. at 422, 143 S.E.2d at 807; see also Douglas v. Medical Investors, Inc., 256 S.C.
440, 447, 182 S.E.2d 720, 723 (1971) (allowing assignment, based on Sandy Island test, of
commercial easement in gross for use of driveway). A Utah court recently adopted the
Sandy Island test, finding that an easement in gross for driving cattle across the servient
tenement was commercial and, therefore, transferable. See Crane v. Crane, 683 P.2d 1062,
1067 (Utah 1984).
62. RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 489 comment b.
63. Id. comment a; see also 2 AMEicAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.78 (A.J. Casner ed.
1952) (observing that transferability of commercial easements in gross is "desirable"); 3
POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 4, T 419 (noting the courts' acceptance of the transferability of
commercial easements in gross).
64. See, e.g., City of Anaheim v. Metropolitan Water Dist., 82 Cal. App. 3d 763, 768,
147 Cal. Rptr. 336, 340 (1978) (easements for rights of way transferred to city and easements
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traditionally supports the transferability of commercial easement
interests, the courts have noted another reason for justifying the
free transferability of public commercial easements in gross: the
benefit that the easement provides inures to the entire community,
rather than to one individual or business.66 In Champaign Na-
tional Bank v. Illinois Power Co.,67 for example, the court rejected
plaintiff's attempt to thwart the transfer of a right of way ease-
ment in gross to defendant power company for the construction of
power lines.6 8 Stating that "commercial easements in gross are
alienable, especially when the easements are for utility purposes,"
the court upheld the transfer, finding that it served the public's
interest.8 9
2. Noncommercial Easements in Gross
Although courts that recognize the distinction between com-
mercial and noncommercial easements consistently allow the trans-
fer of commercial easements in gross, these courts are equally con-
sistent in refusing to allow the transfer of noncommercial
easements in gross. Courts fear that the exercise of noncommercial
for water lines transferred to water district); Albury v. Central and S. Fla. Flood Control
Dist., 99 So. 2d 248, 250, 252 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (drainage and canal easements trans-
ferred to flood control district); Kansas City Area Transp. Auth. v. Ashley, 485 S.W.2d 641,
645 (Mo. App. 1972) (easement for bus patrons to park cars on lot transferred to municipal
transportation authority); City of Papillion v. Schram, 204 Neb. 110, 111-12, 281 N.W.2d
528, 530 (1979) (easement to take water for village's water supply transferred to city); City
of San Antonio v. Ruble, 453 S.W.2d 280, 282 (Tex. 1970) (easement to construct dam for
flood control transferred to river authority); Thew v. Lower Colo. River Auth., 259 S.W.2d
939, 942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (easement allowing flooding of land by dam construction
transferred to river authority).
65. See, e.g., Belusko v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 198 F. Supp. 140, 147 (S.D. IlM. 1961)
(transfer of easements for gas pipeline to "commercial utility"), af'd, 308 F.2d 832 (7th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 930 (1963); Champaign Nat'l Bank v. Illinois Power Co., 125 IlM.
App. 3d 424, 431, 465 N.E.2d 1016, 1021 (1984) (transfer of easement for power lines to
electric company); Johnston v. Michigan Consol. Gas Co., 337 Mich. 572, 582, 60 N.W.2d
464, 469 (1953) (transfer of easement for gas lines to gas company); Banach v. Home Gas
Co., 23 Misc. 2d 556, 559, 199 N.Y.S.2d 858, 862 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (same); Ziegler v. Ohio
Water Serv. Co., 18 Ohio St. 2d 101, 106, 247 N.E.2d 728, 731 (1969) (transfer of easement
for water pipeline to water company). But cf. Delmarva Power & Light Co. v. Eberhard, 247
Md. 273, 277, 230 A.2d 644, 646-47 (1967) (holding that easement for electric lines was not
public easement in gross because a privately owned electric company held the rights, rather
than a governmental unit); see also supra note 39.
66. See Salvaty v. Falcon Cable Television, 165 Cal. App. 3d 798, _ , 212 Cal. Rptr.
31, 35-36 (1985); City of Anaheim, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 768, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 340; Ziegler, 18
Ohio St. 2d at 106, 247 N.E.2d at 731.
67. 125 11. App. 3d 424, 465 N.E.2d 1016 (1984).
68. Id. at 426-27, 465 N.E.2d at 1017-18.
69. Id. at 431, 465 N.E.2d at 1021 (emphasis added).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:109
rights by one other than the original holder would burden the ser-
vient owner's land beyond the contemplation of the original par-
ties.70 The most common type of easement in gross interest that
courts classify as noncommercial and nontransferable is the recrea-
tional or "novelty" easement.71 Nontransferable recreational ease-
ments in gross include hunting rights,72 camping rights,7 and boat-
ing and fishing rights.74 Other types of personal, nontransferable
easements in gross are private rights of way75 and private rights of
storage.76
The courts' treatment of prescriptive easements in gross illus-
trates the courts' reluctance to allow the transfer of noncommercial
easements in gross. Courts recognize that a person can acquire an
easement in gross by prescription.7 7 Courts, nevertheless, view pre-
scriptive easements in gross as being so closely bound up in the
actions and interests of the holder that they are incapable of trans-
fer.71 For example the Idaho Supreme Court, in West v. Smith,79
70. 3 POWFLL & ROHAN, supra note 4, 419, at 34-220.
71. See Drye v. Eagle Rock Ranch, Inc., 364 S.W.2d 196, 209 (Tex. 1962).
72. See, e.g., Maw v. Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist., 20 Utah 2d 195, 196-97,
436 P.2d 230, 231-32 (1968).
Many courts classify hunting rights as profits a prendre, rather than easements in
gross. See Mikesh v. Peters, 284 N.W.2d 215, 217 (Iowa 1979); Hanson v. Fergus Falls Nat'l
Bank, 242 Minn. 498, 508, 65 N.W.2d 857, 861 (1954); Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 1395 (1956).
73. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Workman's Circle Camp of the New York Branches, Inc., 28
A.D.2d 734, 734, 282 N.Y.S.2d 293, 294 (1967).
74. See, e.g., Williams v. Diederich, 359 Mo. 683, 686, 223 S.W.2d 402, 403-04 (1949).
But cf. Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Ass'n, 331 Pa. 241, 249-50, 200 A. 646, 650
(1938) (assignment of easement in gross for boating and fishing rights upheld because
commercial).
75. See, e.g., Rose Lawn Cemetery Ass'n v. Scott, 229 Ark. 639, 642-43, 317 S.W.2d
265, 267 (1958).
76. See, e.g., Taylor v. Dennehy, 136 Conn. 398, 403, 71 A.2d 596, 598 (1950) (ease-
ment for use of garage on adjoining land to store car not transferable because personal to
original grantee).
77. See Saunders Point Ass'n, Inc. v. Cannon, 177 Conn. 413, 417, 418 A.2d 70, 73
(1979); Loughran v. Matylewicz, 367 Pa. 593, 598, 81 A.2d 879, 882 (1951); Crane v. Crane,
683 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Utah 1984).
Persons gain prescriptive easements by exercising a right adverse to the owner's posses-
sion, continuously and without interruption, for a specified period. RESTATEMENT, supra
note 3, § 457.
78. See, e.g., LeDeit v. Ehlert, 205 Cal. App. 2d 154, 166, 22 Cal. Rptr. 747, 755 (1962)
(prescriptive easement in gross for right of way across defendant's land to reach hunting
parcel only usable by holder); Morgan v. McLougblin, 6 Misc. 2d 434, 438, 163 N.Y.S.2d 51,
55 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (father's acquisition of prescriptive easement in gross for roadway to
beach not inheritable by son). But see, e.g., Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Ass'n,
331 Pa. 241, 248, 200 A. 646, 650 (1938) (prescriptive easement in gross for bathing rights in
lake was assignable because commercial); Crane, 683 P.2d at 1067 (prescriptive easement in
gross to drive cattle across land was assignable because commercial).
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upheld defendants' acquisition of a prescriptive easement in gross
to moor their houseboat to plaintiffs' lakefront property.8 0 Yet, in
light of the general nontransferability of easements in gross and
the strict limitations that the law places on prescriptive rights, the
court held that "any prescriptive right which the [defendants] may
have acquired applies solely to them and not to guests or
assignees."81
D. Intent of the Parties
In deciding whether to allow the transfer of an easement in
gross, courts often look at the intent of the parties to the original
transaction. Welsh argued that courts should make the parties' in-
tention controlling as "the true rule of construction" in determin-
ing transferability.82 Mirroring Welsh's position, the Pennsylvania
court in Miller stated that an easement in gross should be transfer-
able if the parties authorized transferability in the original transac-
tion. 3 Only one court since 1945, however, has accepted Welsh and
Miller and made the intention of the parties the single controlling
consideration in the transferability determination. The Montana
Supreme Court, in Lindley v. Maggert,s4 allowed the transfer of an
easement in gross for a right of way. The court held that the par-
ties' intent as evidenced in their agreement controlled the
transfer.8 5
In sharp contrast to Lindley, some courts have ignored com-
pletely the parties' intent.8 6 Most courts, however, regard the in-
79. 95 Idaho 550, 511 P.2d 1326, 1332-33 (1973).
80. Id. at 556-57, 511 P.2d at 1332-33.
81. Id.
82. Welsh, supra note 6, at 284.
83. Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Ass'n, 331 Pa. 241, 250, 200 A. 646, 651
(1938). The court observed that "[Tihere does not seem to be any reason why the law
should prohibit the assignment of an easement in gross if the parties to its creation evidence
their intention to make it assignable." Id.
84. - Mont. -, 645 P.2d 430 (1982).
85. Id. at - , 645 P.2d at 431. The court stated: "Whether or not such an easement
may be alienated. . . depends upon the manner and terms of the creation of the easement."
Id.
86. See, e.g., Taylor v. Dennehy, 136 Conn. 398, 402, 71 A.2d 596, 598 (1950) (refusing
to look beyond the creating instrument to determine intention of parties concerning trans-
ferability); Burcky v. Knowles, 120 N.H. 244, 248-49, 413 A.2d 585, 588 (1980) (same); War-
ren v. Brenner, 89 Ohio App. 188, 190, 196, 101 N.E.2d 157, 159, 161 (1950) (refusing to
extend easement for use of a stairway beyond life of grantee even though the creating in-
strument said that parties intended that the right "'shall hold good during the life of said
brick building and stairway' ").
Courts that have ignored completely the parties' intent often have reached results that
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tent of the parties as one element to consider in determining
whether easements in gross are transferable. One group of courts
holds that the absence of the words "heirs and assigns" in the orig-
inal instrument indicates an intention to limit the easement right
to the original holder.87 In contrast, another group of courts inter-
prets the absence of any limiting language as an indication that the
parties intended the right to be transferable as an easement appur-
tenant.88 Courts frequently interpret the presence of words such as
"heirs and assigns" in the original easement instrument to mean
that the parties intended the easement to be transferable. Some
courts hold that these words create easements appurtenant and al-
low the transfer.8 9 Other courts allow the transfer on a different
theory, reasoning that the parties intended these words to create
transferable easements in gross.90 Even in this latter group of
are totally at odds with the creating instrument. Compare LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d
984, 987 (Me. 1979) (holding that an easement in gross was personal to the original holder
and not transferable, even though creating instrument reserved the easement right in favor
of" 'the grantor and others' ") (emphasis added) with Todd v. Nobach, 368 Mich. 544, 547,
118 N.W.2d 402, 404 (1962) (holding that an easement was transferable even though the
creating instrument reserved to the original holder the right "'to personally have the privi-
lege of ingress and egress' ") (emphasis added). See also Gross v. Cizouskas, 53 A.D.2d 969,
970, 385 N.Y.S.2d 832, 834 (1976) (holding that easement in gross was nonassignable even
though grantor reserved easement to himself "'in common with others' ").
87. In Gilbert v. Workman's Circle Camp, 28 A.D.2d 734, 734, 282 N.Y.S.2d 293, 294
(1967), the court stated: "[I]n the absence of any specific intent on (the original grantees']
part in conveying such premises to include this right personal to them, it did not pass to
their successors in title." Accord Williams v. Diederich, 359 Mo. 683, 686, 223 S.W.2d 402,
403-04 (1949). Compare St. Louis v. DeBon, 204 Cal. App. 2d 464, 466, 22 Cal. Rptr. 443,
444 (1962) (in dictum, an easement in gross is assignable only, if at all, through specific
words of assignment) with LeDeit v. Ehlert, 205 Cal. App. 2d 154, 166, 22 Cal. Rptr. 747,
755 (1962) (in dictum, an easement in gross is transferable "unless restricted" in the grant).
88. See, e.g., St. Louis, 204 Cal. App. 2d at 466, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 444 (saying that
parties can assign an easement appurtenant with the dominant estate without a specific
mention of the easement); Birdsey v. Kosienski, 140 Conn. 403, 410, 101 A.2d 274, 277-78
(1953) (saying parties intended a "permanent easement" rather than a "personal" easement
despite lack of the words "heirs and assigns" in original grant); Chain Locations of Am., Inc.
v. Westchester County, 20 Misc. 2d 411, 413-14, 190 N.Y.S.2d 12, 15 (Sup. Ct. 1959);
DeShon v. Parker, 49 Ohio App. 2d 366, 367, 361 N.E.2d 457, 458 (1974); Scott v. Leonard,
119 Vt. 86, 97-98, 119.A.2d 691, 698 (1956); Sabins v. McAllister, 116 Vt. 302, 305-06, 76
A.2d 106, 108 (1950).
89. See, e.g., Siferd v. Stambor, 5 Ohio App. 2d 79, 87, 214 N.E.2d 106, 111 (1966)
(holding that easement for use of restroom in neighboring building by restaurant employees
was appurtenant because of the words" 'heirs and assigns"' in original instrument); Lynn v.
Turpin, 187 Tenn. 384, 386-87, 215 S.W.2d 794, 795-96 (1948) (holding that parties intended
easement to take water from neighbor's well to be appurtenant because of the words "'heirs
and assigns forever'" in original instrument).
90. See, e.g., Moore v. Schultz, 22 N.J. Super. 24, 30-31, 91 A.2d 514, 517 (App. Div.
1952), aff'd per curiam, 12 N.J. 329, 96 A.2d 732 (1953); Weber v. Dockray, 2 N.J. Super.
492, 496, 64 A.2d 631, 633 (Ch. Div. 1949); Sunset Lake Water Serv. Dist. v. Remington, 45
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courts, intent is only one of several considerations in the analysis;91
nevertheless, this group has come close to Welsh's ideal that the
intent of the parties, rather than legal labels, should control the
transferability of easements in gross.
E. Statutory Developments: The Conservation Easement Act
Example
Although the transferability of easements in gross has not de-
veloped significantly at common law, the statutory treatment of
easements in gross has been developing rapidly since 1945. In the
early years of this development, one commentator noted that a few
legislatures had passed statutes to facilitate the transfer of ease-
ments in gross for the benefit of "public service companies." '92 The
statutory development has continued this piecemeal pattern with
legislatures providing for the transfer of easements in gross to spe-
cific holders for limited purposes. At the present, only Indiana has
squarely confronted the common law presumption against the
transfer of easements in gross. 3
The development of conservation easement acts for environ-
mental conservation and historic preservation provides a recent ex-
ample of the statutory approach to the transfer of easements in
gross.9 4 Conservation easement acts usually limit those who may
Or. App. 973, 977, 609 P.2d 896, 899 (1980); Douglas v. Medical Investors, Inc., 256 S.C. 440,
447-48, 182 S.E.2d 720, 724 (1971); Thew v. Lower Colo. River Auth., 259 S.W.2d 939, 941-
42 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
91. For example, the New Jersey chancery court in Weber stated that a court would
recognize the right to assign an easement in gross depending on three elements: the inten-
tion of the parties, the burden on the servient tenement, and the existing circumstances at
the time of the grant. 2 N.J. Super. at 496, 64 A.2d at 633; see also Douglas, 256 S.C. at 447-
48, 182 S.E.2d at 723-24 (allowing assignment of easement in gross based on commercial/
noncommercial distinction and on parties' use of "'heirs and assigns' ").
92. Kloek, supra note 6, at 256-57.
93. See IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-2-1 (Burns Supp. 1984). The Indiana statute reads:
"Easements in gross. . . may be alienated, inherited, and assigned if instruments that cre-
ate such easements in real property so state." Id. (emphasis added).
Maryland, although not as explicit concerning transferability as Indiana's statute, also
has a general easement statute: "No words of inheritance are necessary to create . . . an
easement by grant or by reservation. Unless a contrary intention appears by express terms
or is necessarily implied,. . . every grant or reservation of an easement passes or reserves an
easement in perpetuity." MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 4-105 (1981).
A few western states have statutes, modeled after California's Civil Code, that recognize
the validity of easements in gross as "servitudes unattached to the land." The statutes,
however, say nothing concerning transferability. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 802 (West 1982);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-102 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-05-02 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 60, § 50 (West 1971); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 43-13-1 (1983).
94. See, e.g., ARK STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1201 to -1206 (Supp. 1983); CAL. Cxv. CODE §§ 815-
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hold conservation easements to governmental units or private non-
profit organizations. 5 Legislatures, however, recognize that the en-
tity acquiring the easement may not always be the holder and that
the need for allowing the right of transfer may arise. A county, for
instance, that acquires a conservation easement to protect a scenic
area of a river may want to transfer the easement to a state conser-
vation agency that could administer protection for the entire wa-
terway. Similarly, a city that holds a preservation easement in a
816 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-30.5-101 to -110 (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 47-42a to -42c (West 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 6901-6906 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 704.06 (West Supp. 1984); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 85-1406 to -1410 (Supp. 1984); IDAHO
CODE § 67-4613 (1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, §§ 401-406 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IND.
CODE. ANN. § 32-5-2.6-1 to -7 (Burns Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 111D.1-.5 (West
1984); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 667-668 (1978 & Supp. 1984); MD. REAL PROP. CODE
ANN. § 2-118 (1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, §§ 31-32 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985);
MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 399.251-.257 (West Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 84.64-.65
(West 1977); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-17-101 to -102 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 111.390-.440
(1983); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 477:45-:47 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:8B-1 to -9 (West
Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 121-34 to -42 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08 (1983);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5301.67 -.70 (Page 1981); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 271.715-.795 (1983); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 34-39-1 to -5 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-9-10 to -30 (Law. Co-op. 1977 &
Supp. 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 1-19B-56 to -60 (Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 66-9-301 to -309 (1982); TEx. NAT. REs. CODE ANN. §§ 183.001-.005 (Vernon Supp. 1985);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-18a-1 to -6 (1978); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.40 (West Supp. 1985). For a
complete discussion of the benefit of these acts in conserving natural and historic resources,
see generally Netherton, Environmental Conservation and Historic Preservation Through
Recorded Land-Use Agreements, 14 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 540 (1979).
Using easements in gross for conservation and preservation provides several advantages.
First, acquiring an easement to conserve a natural open space or to preserve a historically or
architecturally important building is much less costly than purchasing title to the underly-
ing fee itself. See id. at 542. The Rhode Island act, for example, notes the economic advan-
tage in using easements for preservation and conservation in its purpose section: "This
chapter is further intended to provide the people of Rhode Island with the continued diver-
sity of history and landscape that is unique to this state without great expenditures of pub-
lic funds." R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-39-1 (1984). Second, acquiring an easement for conservation
or preservation is a much simpler transaction between two parties than obtaining a zoning
ordinance for the same purpose through a municipality. See Netherton, supra, at 542.
Third, the Commissioners of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act (the "Uniform Act")
noted that despite the confusion surrounding easement law, the legal system prefers dealing
with easements because they are more flexible in scope and have less strict requirements
than restrictive covenants or equitable servitudes. UNW. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, pref-
atory note, 12 U.L.A. 55, 56 (Supp. 1981).
95. See statutes cited supra note 94. Two states have extended holder's rights to busi-
nesses and corporations without the nonprofit limitations. See MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 399.253-.254 (West Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-35(2) (1981). Only four states
have extended holder's right to private individuals. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 404(c)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (right to enforce only); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-118(e)
(1981) (right to hold and enforce); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-17-101 (18), -102(7) (1983) (no
holding restrictions listed); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-18a-3 (1978) (any "party entitled to hold
real property interests" may hold preservation easement).
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historic structure may prefer to transfer the interest to a private
historical preservation society, which would be more knowledgea-
ble of the structure's significance and better equipped to enforce
compliance with the easement terms. To accommodate these inter-
ests, some states provide a statutory right of transfer. The states,
however, are not uniform in the manner in which they approach
the transferability question.
Some states approach the question of transferability by retain-
ing the term "easement in gross" to describe the conservation in-
terest. 6 The Maryland statute typifies this group, stating that the
conservation interest is "enforceable . . .as an easement in gross,
and as such it is inheritable and assignable.97 Colorado calls its
interest a "conservation easement in gross,"9 8 but declares that the
interest "shall not be deemed personal" 99 and is "perpetual."' 100
The Montana statute recognizes that conservation and preserva-
tion easements can be in gross,10 but does not address
transferability.
The Uniform Conservation Easement Act'02 ("Uniform Act")
adopts a second approach to the question of the transferability of
an easement in gross. The Uniform Act carefully avoids labeling
the interest as an easement in gross or an easement appurtenant
and chooses instead to use the more general term "conservation
easement."' 03 Nevertheless, when enumerating the elements of a
96. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-30.5-102 (1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6902 (Supp.
1984); GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1408 (Supp. 1984); MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-118(c) (1981);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-102(7) (1983) ("servitude ... not attached to land").
97. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 2-118(c) (emphasis added); see also DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 7, § 6902 (same language); GA. CODE ANN. § 85-1408 (same language).
98. COLO. REv. STAT. § 38-30.5-102.
99. Id. § 38-30.5-103(2).
100. Id. § 38-30.5-103(3).
101. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-17-102(7).
102. 12 U.L.A. 57 (Supp. 1981). Approved in 1981, the Uniform Act has been adopted
in whole or in part in eight juridictions. See ARY. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-1201 to -1206 (Supp.
1985) (some additions); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 32-5-2.6-1 to -7 (Burns Supp. 1985); NEv. REv.
STAT. §§ 111.390-.440 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08(4) (1983) (§ 4 of Uniform Act
only); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 271.715-.795 (1983) (some additions); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 1-
19B-56 to -60 (Supp. 1984) (some deletions); TEm NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 183.001-005
(Vernon Supp. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.40(1)-(6) (West Supp. 1985).
103. Section 1(1) of the Uniform Act reads:
"Conservation easement" means a nonpossessory interest of a holder in real prop-
erty imposing limitations or affirmative obligations the purposes of which include re-
taining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values of real property, assuring its
availability for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use, protecting natural
resources, maintaining or enhancing air or water quality, or preserving the historical,
architectural, archaeological, or cultural aspects of real property.
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valid conservation easement, the Uniform Act cures many of the
traditional common-law shortcomings of the easement in gross. 104
The Uniform Act "clarifies common law"10 5 by recognizing that the
conservation easement is transferable.'
A third approach, similar to the Uniform Act, construes the
conservation or preservation interest as an "easement.' 10 Like the
Uniform Act, these statutes do not label the interest specifically as
an easement in gross or as an easement appurtenant. 0 Unlike the
Uniform Act, however, most of these states do not treat the conser-
vation easement implicitly as an easement in gross; rather, these
states have taken special pains to treat conservation easements as
easements appurtenant. 09 Florida and Idaho, for example, declare
that conservation easements "shall run with the land."" 0 Recog-
nizing that courts may treat conservation easements as being in
gross, several of these states' statutes declare that the easement
shall be enforceable despite a lack of appurtenance to a dominant
12 U.L.A. at 53 (Supp. 1981); ARYa STAT. ANN. § 50-1201(1); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-2.6-1;
NEV. REV. STAT. § 111.410; 0P& REV. STAT. § 271.715(1); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-19B-
56(1); TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 183.001; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.40(1)(a).
104. Section 4 of the Uniform Act reads:
A conservation easement is valid even though:
(1) it is not appurtenant to an interest in real property;,
(2) it can be or has been assigned to another holder;
(3) it is not of a character that has been recognized traditionally at common law;
(4) it imposes a negative burden;
(5) it imposes affirmative obligations upon the owner of an interest in the burdened
property or upon the holder;
(6) the benefit does not touch or concern real property; or
(7) there is no privity of estate or of contract.
12 U.L.A. at 60-61 (Supp. 1981); AR& STAT. ANN. § 50-1204; IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-2.6-4;
NEv. REV. STAT. § 111.440; N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-08(4); Oa REV. STAT. § 271.745; S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-19B-59; Tax. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 183.004; Wis. STAT. ANN. §
700.40(4).
105. Commissioners' comment to § 4(2), 12 U.L.A. at 61 (Supp. 1981).
106. Uniform Act § 4(2), 12 U.L.A. at 61 (Supp. 1981); ARYa STAT. ANN. § 50-1204(2);
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-2.6-4(2); NEV. REv. STAT. § 111.440(2); N.D. CENT. CODE § 55-10-
08(4)(b); OR. REV. STAT. § 271.745(2); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-198-59(2); Tax. NAT. RaS.
CODE ANN. § 183.004(2); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 700.40(4)(b).
107. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 815-816 (West 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.06 (West Supp.
1985); IDAHO CODE § 67-4613 (1980); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 111D.1-.8 (West 1984); MIcH. CoMp.
LAWS ANN. §§ 399.251-.257 (West Supp. 1985); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5301.67-.70 (Page
1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1047.le(a)(12) (Purdon Supp. 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 66-
9-301 to -309 (1982).
108. See statutes cited supra note 107.
109. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 815.2(b), (c); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.06(4); IDAHO CODE § 67-
4613; IOWA CODE ANN. § 111D.2; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 71, § 1047.le(a)(12).
110. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.06(4); IDAHO CODE § 67-4613.
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tenement."' Perhaps because of the implicit emphasis on treating
conservation easements as appurtenant rather than in gross, only
half of the states in this group recognize by statute that conserva-
tion easements are transferable.1 2 Presumably, the other half of
the group expects common law rules to determine the transferabil-
ity of conservation easements.
The last statutory approach to the transferability question ap-
pears in those states that do not refer to conservation or preserva-
tion rights as easements at all; instead, these states use the general
term "conservation restriction," 3 which is defined broadly as an
interest "in the form of a restriction, easement, covenant or condi-
tion."1 4 These states, in effect, have created a new hybrid of real
servitude; each state among this group, except one, explicitly al-
lows transferability on a clean slate.1 5 For example, the South
Carolina statute provides that despite common law precedent, a
conservation restriction "shall be devisable, assignable, and other-
wise freely alienable, whether held by public or private
interests."11
The conservation easement acts are a good example of the va-
ried approaches that legislatures have taken to adapt the common-
law easement in gross to a modern usage. Some legislatures, like
some courts, have avoided the transferability question by calling
easements in gross for conservation and preservation by other
names. Other legislatures and the Uniform Act have tried to erase
111. See MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 399.253; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5301.70; TENN.
CODE ANN. § 66-9-306.
112. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 704.06(2); IOWA CODE ANN. § 111D.2; MCH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 399.256(2), (3); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5301.70. The California, Idaho, Pennsylvania,
and Tennessee statutes make no mention of transferability.
113. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 47-42a to -42c (West 1978); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30,
§§ 401-406 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) ("conservation right"); MR REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 33,
§§ 476-479 (Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, §§ 31-32 (West 1977 & Supp.
1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 84.64-.65 (West 1977 & Supp. 1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§§ 477:45-:47 (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:8B-1 to -9 (West Supp. 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 121-34 to -42 (1981) ("conservation" and "preservation agreement"); RI. GEN. LAWS
§§ 34-39-1 to -5 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 27-9-10 to -30 (Law. Co-op. 1977 & Supp. 1984).
114. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-42a(a), (b); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 401(a); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 184, § 31; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 84.64(2); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 477:45(I),
(II); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:8B-2(b), (d); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-35(1), (3); R.L GEN. LAWS § 34-
39-2(a), (b); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-9-10.
115. Massachusetts does not allow explicitly for transferability. For states expressly
allowing transfer, see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47-42b; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 30, § 401(b); ME
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 477(1); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 84.65(1), (3); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 477:46; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:8B-4; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 121-38; R. GEN. LAWS § 34-39-3(a);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-9-30.
116. S.C. CODE § 27-9-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984).
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the appurtenant/in gross distinction in favor of a general "conser-
vation easement" that is transferable despite its benefit to land or
person. Finally, some legislatures have confronted the interests
squarely as easements in gross and have declared them to be
transferable.
IV. DIVISIBILITY
A. The "One Stock" Approach
The courts' and legislatures' recognition that easements in
gross are transferable raises a related question-the divisibility of
easements in gross. Divisibility differs from transferability because
the original holder of the easement grants only a portion of his
rights to another while retaining the remainder of his original
rights for his own use.117 Divisibility, however, cannot arise as an
issue unless courts first recognize transferability. If a court does
not permit the transfer of an easement in gross as a whole, a court
clearly will not permit a partial transfer of the easement.
The creating instrument is the starting point for determining
whether an easement in gross is divisible." 8 Because division of
easements most often occurs in commercial settings,"19 the original
parties usually have a written instrument to which courts may re-
fer when determining whether to allow a division. By reference to
the creating instrument, courts first must discern whether the orig-
inal grant of the easement in gross was exclusive or nonexclusive.
An exclusive grant of an easement in gross gives the easement
holder complete control of the easement interest, even to the ex-
clusion of the owner of the underlying land.120 A nonexclusive
grant, on the other hand, retains for the owner of the underlying
land a right to use the easement interest simultaneously with the
117. See Hoffman v. Capitol Cablevision Sys., Inc., 52 A.D.2d 313, 315, 383 N.Y.S.2d
674, 676 (1976).
118. See Brown v. Heidersbach, 172 Ind. App. 434, 438, 360 N.E.2d 614, 618 (1977).
The court stated that "[easements created by grant depend, for the determination of the
extent of the right acquired, upon the terms of the grant properly construed .... Id.
(emphasis added).
119. See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
120. See 3 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 4, 1 419, at 34-225. But cf. Passaic Valley
Council Boy Scouts of Am. v. Hartwood Syndicate, Inc., 46 A.D.2d 247, 250, 361 N.Y.S.2d
945, 948 (1974) (holding that, despite original exclusive grant for easement for recreational
rights on reservoir, grantee's successor could not prevent grantor's latest successor from




easement holder. " ' The resulting rule states that an easement
holder can divide his interest only if his original grant was exclu-
sive. 12 According to this rule, because the landowner has granted
away all of his rights to the easement area, he cannot object to his
grantee's division of the easement if the total use remains within
the extent of the original grant.1 2 The holder of a nonexclusive
right, however, cannot divide his easement because the right of di-
vision remains with the owner of the underlying land. 24
After deciding this threshold question, courts next must deter-
mine whether the exercise of the divided easement complies with
the terms of the original grant. The traditional rule developed
from the sixteenth century decision of Lord Mountjoy's Case.12 5
Lord Mountjoy conveyed a piece of land to Brown but retained for
himself the right to dig for ore in the land.126 Mountjoy subse-
quently transferred his right to dig to two other parties.' 27 In ap-
proving the division of Mountjoy's profit a prendre, the court lim-
ited its holding with the restriction that "the two assignees could
not work severally, but together with one stock, or such workmen
as belonged to them both."'' 28
The "one stock" rule was a check on the division of easements
through the first half of this century. In 1938 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, for example, reaffirmed the "one stock" rule in
Miller v. Lutheran Conference & Camp Association.'29 The court
recognized that the original grantee of an easement in gross for
commercial boating, bathing, and fishing rights to a lake could di-
vide his easement with another party. 30 The court asserted, how-
ever, that the parties had to exercise their use of the easement
jointly as "one stock."'' Because the two parties did not have
"common consent and joinder" to the transaction, the court con-
121. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 493 comment d.
122. See Hoffman, 52 A.D.2d at 315-16, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 676; Hinds v. Phillips Petro-
leum Co., 591 P.2d 697, 699 (Okla. 1979); RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 493 comment c.
123. See Friedman Transfer & Constr. Co. v. City of Youngstown, 176 Ohio St. 209,
211-12, 198 N.E.2d 661, 663 (1964).
124. See Consolidated Gas Co. v. City Gas Co., 477 So. 2d 351, 352 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984); RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 493 comment d.
125. 78 Eng. Rep. 11 (1583).
126. Id. The right was exclusive because Mountjoy had complete control of the prop-
erty interest.
127. Id. at 11-12.
128. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
129. 331 Pa. 241, 200 A. 646 (1938).
130. Id. at 250-51, 200 A. at 651.
131. Id.
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cluded that the division of the easement rights to the camp was
invalid.132
The rationale for the "one stock" rule is to prevent the impo-
sition of a "surcharge" on the servient tenement."' 3 A surcharge on
the servient tenement occurs when the holder's use of the ease-
ment exceeds the terms of the original grant and interferes unrea-
sonably with the fee owner's rightful use of his land.134 Even if the
parties do not restrict the terms of the grant, courts will impose a
duty on the easement holder to exercise his rights in a reasonable
manner.3 5 A surcharge on the easement can result in the holder's
forced cure of the excessive burden, l3 " the holder's liability to the
servient owner in trespass,3 7 and, if seriously excessive, the termi-
nation of the holder's easement interest. s38
B. Independent Exercise Not to Exceed Original Burden
Although the "one stock" rule has endured for 400 years, the
rule recently has lost ground to the notion of the original burden.
Divisibility cases usually concern public commercial easements in
gross for utilities3 9 or rights of way. 40 These divided easement
132. Id. at 252, 200 A. at 652. One commentator criticized Miller for its reliance on the
"one stock" rule to prevent a surcharge on the easement. See Kloek, supra note 6, at 255.
He argued that, as a practical matter, the "one stock" rule is unworkable because the nature
of commercial easement rights rarely permits the holder and his transferee to exercise their
rights jointly. Id. at 255-56. He reasoned that courts should allow division of exclusive com-
mercial easements into separate rights if the independent exercise of the easement does not
exceed the original extent of the easement burden. Id. If the transferees of a divided interest
did cause a surcharge on the servient estate, then the fee owner would have the same reme-
dies available agaisnt the transferees as against the original holder. Id. at 255.
133. 3 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 4, 1 419, at 34-224.
134. 1 G. THOMPSON, supra note 16, § 427, at 660-63.
135. See Beckwith v. Rossi, 157 Me. 532, 536-37, 175 A.2d 732, 735 (1961).
136. See, e.g., County of Johnson v. Weber, 160 Neb. 432, 444, 70 N.W.2d 440, 447-48
(1955) (forcing easement holder to reduce height of levee to original easement terms).
137. See, e.g., Reed v. A.C. McLoon & Co., 311 A.2d 548, 552 (Me. 1973) (easement
holder of right to maintain gasoline storage tanks on servient tenement liable in trespass for
maintaining kerosene storage tanks on which landowner's young son injured); Beetschen v.
Shell Pipe Line Corp., 363 Mo. 751, 756-58, 253 S.W.2d 785, 786-87 (1952) (holder of sub-
surface easement for pipeline liable in trespass for erecting fence along surface of plaintiff's
land).
138. See, e.g., Crimmins v. Gould, 149 Cal. App. 2d 383, 390-94, 308 P.2d 786, 791-93
(1957) (holder's unreasonably excessive use of right of way not curable by injunction re-
sulted in forfeiture of easement).
139. See, e.g., Salvaty v. Falcon Cable Television, 165 Cal. App. 3d 798, 212 Cal. Rptr.
31 (1985) (telephone lines); Martin v. Music, 254 S.W.2d 701 (Ky. 1953) (sewer line); Hoff-
man v. Capitol Cablevision Sys., Inc., 52 A.D.2d 313, 383 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1976) (power and
telephone lines); Crowley v. New York Tel. Co., 80 Misc. 2d 570, 363 N.Y.S.2d 292 (Dist. Ct.
1975) (telephone lines); Jolliff v. Hardin Cable Television Co., 26 Ohio St. 2d 103, 269
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rights are incapable of joint exercise as one stock because the origi-
nal easement holder, for example, already has installed electric
lines or built a road when he decides to transfer a portion of the
easement. Because public commercial easements provide commu-
nity benefits, courts have been unwilling to invalidate division of
these easements even when the parties do not exercise the rights
jointly as "one stock.I' 'M  The courts instead have chosen a more
realistic limitation on divisibility: the burden that the division
places on the servient owner must not exceed the burden that the
parties contemplated in the original grant.42
Three recent cases concerning the rights of cable television
companies to use existing utility easements illustrate the courts'
applications of the "original burden" standard of divisibility. 43 In
each case, plaintiffs were the owners of the servient tenement
across which they had granted easements for power and telephone
lines to defendants. 4 4 The plaintiffs sued the defendants for divid-
ing their easement interests and transferring to cable television
companies the right to string cable lines along the easements. 45 In
the first case to address the issue, the Ohio Supreme Court in Jol-
liff v. Hardin Cable Television Co.' 46 found a justification for the
division in the terms of the original easement that plaintiff granted
to the power company. Created "'for the purpose of transmitting
electric or other power, including telegraph or telephone
wires . . . ,'" the easement grant bound the power company
N.E.2d 588 (1971) (power lines); Hinds v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 591 P.2d 697 (Okla. 1979)
(oil and gas line); Williams v. Humble Pipe Line Co., 417 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967)
(oil pipeline).
140. See, e.g., City of Anaheim v. Metropolitan Water Dist., 82 Cal. App. 3d 763, 147
Cal. Rptr. 336 (1978); Ziegler v. Ohio Water Serv. Co., 18 Ohio St. 2d 101, 247 N.E.2d 728
(1969); Friedman Transfer & Constr. Co. v. City of Youngstown, 176 Ohio St. 209, 198
N.E.2d 661 (1964).
141. See, e.g., Salvaty, 165 Cal. App. 3d at -, 212 Cal. Rptr. at 31-36; City of
Anaheim, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 768, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 340; Hoffman, 52 A.D.2d at 316-18, 383
N.Y.S.2d at 677-78; Ziegler, 18 Ohio St. 2d at 105-06, 247 N.E.2d at 731.
142. See, e.g., Hoffman, 52 A.D.2d at 316-17, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 677; Jolliff, 26 Ohio St.
2d at 108, 269 N.E.2d at 591; Hinds, 591 P.2d at 699.
143. Jolliff v. Hardin Cable Television Co., 26 Ohio St. 2d 103, 269 N.E.2d 588 (1971);
Hoffman v. Capitol Cablevision Sys., Inc., 52 A.D.2d 313, 383 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1976); Crowley
v. New York Tel. Co., 80 Misc. 2d 570, 363 N.Y.S.2d 292 (Dist. Ct. 1975).
144. Jolliff, 26 Ohio St. 2d at 104, 269 N.E.2d at 589; Hoffman, 52 A.D.2d at 314, 383
N.Y.S.2d at 676; Crowley, 80 Misc. 2d at 571, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
145. Jolliff, 26 Ohio St. 2d at 104, 269 N.E.2d at 589; Hoffman, 52 A.D.2d at 314-15,
383 N.Y.S.2d at 676; Crowley, 80 Misc. 2d at 571, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 293.
146. 26 Ohio St. 2d 103, 269 N.E.2d 588 (1971).
147. Id. at 108, 269 N.E.2d at 589.
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and its "'successors, assigns, lessees, and tenants.' -p148 The court
held that stringing a cable line was not an extra burden on the
easement because the original grant expressly contemplated in-
stalling wires in addition to the electric line.141
A few years later, a New York district court in Crowley v. New
York Telephone Co.' 50 expanded the Jolliff precedent by uphold-
ing the division of a telephone line easement to a cable company,
even though the original grant did not contemplate this use. 5' The
Crowley court stated that the public benefited from access to cable
television and that the court must interpret the 1949 creating in-
strument in light of technological advances. 52 The court, therefore,
upheld the division because of the absence of any express restric-
tions in the original grant. 5 3 On similar facts, the New York Ap-
pellate Division in Hoffman v. Capitol Cablevision System' up-
held the divisibility of an easement despite the absence of express
authorization in the original grant.' 55 According to the court, the
public interest in allowing a cable company to string its lines far
outweighed any additional burden imposed on the servient
tenement.
156
In Jolliff, Crowley, and Hoffman, the cable companies' use of
their divided easement rights was similar to the use authorized by
the original easement that plaintiffs granted to the telephone and
power companies. Although the Jolliff court noted this similar-
ity,157 other courts have not made similarity of use a requirement
for divisibility. 58 For example, the Ohio Supreme Court, prior to
148. Id. at 109, 269 N.E.2d at 590.
149. Id. at 109, 269 N.E.2d at 591.
150. 80 Misc. 2d 570, 363 N.Y.S.2d 292 (Dist. Ct. 1975).
151. Id. at 572, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 294.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 52 A.D.2d 313, 383 N.Y.S.2d 674 (1976).
155. Id. at 316-17, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 677.
156. Id. at 317-18, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 677-78; see also Salvaty v. Falcon Cable Television,
165 Cal. App. 3d 798, -, 212 Cal. Rptr. 31, 35-36 (1985) (relying on Jolliff and Hoffman
in allowing telephone companies to divide easement in gross with cable television company).
157. 26 Ohio St. 2d at 108-09, 269 N.E.2d at 591; see also Martin v. Music, 254 S.W.2d
701, 703 (Ky. 1953) (upholding grantee's division of easement for sewer lines to three assign-
ees because the assignment was for a similar use).
158. See, e.g., City of Anaheim v. Metropolitan Water Dist., 82 Cal. App. 3d 763, 769,
147 Cal. Rptr. 336, 340 (1978) (allowing highway and water line along same easement); Zie-
gler v. Ohio Water Serv. Co., 18 Ohio St. 2d 101, 106, 247 N.E.2d 728, 731 (1969) (same);
Friedman Transfer & Constr. Co. v. City of Youngstown, 176 Ohio St. 209, 213, 198 N.E.2d
661, 663 (1964) (same); Hinds v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 591 P.2d 697, 699-700 (Okla. 1979)
(allowing surface access and oil pipeline along same easement).
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its Jolliff decision, ruled in Freidman Transfer & Construction Co.
v. City of Youngstown 59 that plaintiff could not prevent the city
from installing a water main along a highway bridge easement that
plaintiff earlier had granted to the state. 6 0 The court found that
dividing the highway easement for the water line was a valid sec-
ondary public use of the right of way and that this use imposed no
additional burden on plaintiff.'' Courts require only that the dis-
similar uses of a divided easement be compatible enough to pre-
vent burdening the servient tenement beyond the contemplation of
the original grant.162
Landowners usually contest divisibility of easements to gain
the economic advantage of making the transfer to the second ease-
ment holder, rather than allowing the first grantee to reap the eco-
nomic benefit of a division." 3 Courts have not been sympathetic to
the landowner's position and, as the preceding discussion indicates,
uniformly have supported the first grantee's right to divide his
easement.16 4 Courts have been equally unsympathetic to landowner
challenges to the division of "expansible easements.' 65 Expansible
easements usually arise in the oil and gas industry and, by their
express terms, give the holder the right to expand the burden on
the servient tenement by paying additional consideration to the fee
owner.' 6 Because an expansible easement is so flexible, it renders
the "original burden" restriction on divisibility almost meaning-
less. For example, in Williams v. Humble Pipe Line Co.'67 the
court allowed the first holder to transfer freely the expansible part
of its easement, the right to lay additional oil and gas pipelines, to
a second holder because the creating instrument itself removed the
159. 176 Ohio St. 209, 198 N.E.2d 661 (1964).
160. Id. at 213, 198 N.E.2d at 663.
161. Id. The dissent, however, objected to the division because the uses were so dis-
similar. Id. at 214-15, 198 N.E.2d at 665 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
162. See, e.g., City of Anaheim, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 770, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 341; Hinds,
591 P.2d at 699.
163. See, e.g., Crowley, 80 Misc. 2d at 571, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 293 (plaintiff suing for
"'easement fee'" that cable company had paid to defendant).
164. See supra notes 143-56 and accompanying text.
165. See, e.g., Williams v. Humble Pipe Line Co., 417 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App.
1967).
166. See, e.g., id. at 455; accord Sorrell v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 314
S.W.2d 193, 196 (Ky. 1958); Hamilton v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 236 Miss.
429, 436, 110 So. 2d 612, 614 (1959); Baker v. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co., 194 Tenn.
368, 375, 250 S.W.2d 566, 569 (1952); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Lovell, 392 S.W.2d 748, 750-
51 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
167. 417 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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"original burden" restriction on divisibility.168
V. ANALYSIS
Courts have shown a great reluctance to discard the old com-
mon law standards on transferability and to formulate a new rule
more compatible with modern commercial and noncommercial uses
of easements in gross. Welsh and Kloek noted this reluctance in
the 1940's'e9 and the passage of forty years has not changed mate-
rially the courts' adherence to ancient standards. Welsh and Kloek
each argued that the parties' intent should control any determina-
tion regarding the transferability of an easement in gross. 170 Only
one court to date, however, has followed this approach. 171 For most
courts, the parties' intent is merely one element for the court to
consider when determining whether easements in gross are
transferable. 17 2
The statutory route offers some hope for moving the law to-
ward free transferability of all easements in gross based on the
parties' intent. As the conservation easement acts illustrate, legis-
latures have dealt directly with the issue by statute. 173 The statu-
tory approach, nevertheless, is limited because the statutes gener-
ally address only a few specific easement uses. Indiana stands
alone in passing a general statute that allows for the transfer of
easements in gross based upon the parties' intent.17 4 If other legis-
latures follow Indiana's lead, the statutory approach could contrib-
ute greatly to free transferability of easements in gross.
Courts have had difficulty abandoning the common law rule
prohibiting the transfer of easements in gross because of an exces-
sive dependence on a black-letter system bent on routinely con-
necting legal terms with attendant consequences. Specifically,
courts have taken a legal term in the abstract, such as "easement
in gross," and have attached a consequence to the term, such as
nontransferability, without considering the specific facts of the
case at issue.17 5 If the facts fall into a category that the legal term
168. Id. at 456.
169. See Kloek, supra note 6, at 258-60; Welsh, supra note 6, at 283-84.
170. Kloek, supra note 6, at 258; Welsh, supra note 6, at 284.
171. Lindley v. Maggert, 645 P.2d 430 (Mont. 1982); see supra notes 84-85 and accom-
panying text.
172. See supra notes 82-91 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 94-116 and accompanying text.
174. See IND. CODE ANN. § 32-5-2-1 (Burns Supp. 1985).
175. See McCoy, Logic vs. Value Judgment in Legal and Ethical Thought, 23 VAND.
L. RE v. 1277, 1279, 1281-82 (1970).
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represents, then the particular consequence automatically follows
despite the parties' intentions and the attendant circumstances. To
do justice, therefore, these courts must force the facts of a case
into a different legal category that allows for the proper conse-
quence or must carve out an exception to the general rule.
LeMay v. Anderson1 8 illustrates the counterproductive nature
of this process. In LeMay the court ruled that the expressed reser-
vation of a right of way "to the Grantor and others" for the pur-
pose of crossing plaintiff's land was an easement in gross. 177 Be-
cause of this classification, the court concluded that the interest
was nontransferable.'7 8 The severity of the defendant's situation,
however, compelled the court to imply an easement of necessity
along the same route.179 By forcing a different label on the ease-
ment, the LeMay court arguably left the parties with the same
rights and encumbrances they would have had under the express
easement in gross while imposing a new hindrance of an implied
delineation of the parties' rights.
Courts also have had problems overcoming the common-law
prohibitions against transferring or dividing easements in gross be-
cause of an overreliance on legal terminology unsuited for the mod-
ern role of easements in gross. In 1945 Welsh noted this problem
and advocated the abolition of the in gross/appurtenant distinc-
tion. ' More recently, some commentators have advocated a radi-
cal restructuring of the entire law of servitudes into a single body
of law.' 8 ' Property law, however, does not move with such giant
steps. Property law regarding easements would be better served if
courts focused on the specific interest that the parties designed the
easement to protect, whether the interest be appurtenant or in
gross. A starting place would be to eliminate completely the pre-
sumption that favors finding easements appurtenant rather than
easements in gross. 82 As long as this presumption exists, courts
have no incentive to confront the interest as an easement in gross
because they can reclassify the interest as a less restricted ease-
ment appurtenant. With the presumption removed, courts may
176. 397 A.2d 984 (Me. 1979).
177. Id. at 986.
178. Id. at 989.
179. Id.
180. Welsh, supra note 6, at 283-84.
181. See French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient
Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1304-18 (1982); Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of
Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1230-59 (1982).
182. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
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look more directly at the actual circumstances of each case and
then give more weight to the parties' intent when determining
transferability of all types of easements in gross. As the Duchess
told Alice at the croquet party: "[T]he moral of that is-'Take care
of the sense, and the sounds will take care of themselves.' '-183
When courts have eliminated the common law presumption
against transferability, as with public commercial easements in
gross, the law has moved much more rapidly. The development of
the original burden notion for divisibility illustrates this rapid-
ity.18 4 Courts began to allow the holders of commercial easements
in gross to transfer their interests according to the intent in the
original grant and the surrounding economic circumstances. As a
result, no reason remained to prevent holders from then dividing
their easements according to the same terms. Thus freed from the
common law presumption against transferability, courts quickly
overcame the common law restriction of Mountjoy's "one stock"
rule on divisibility. 8 5 Courts found that the parties' intent and ec-
onomic circumstances would allow independent exercise of divided
easement interests if the holders did not exceed the original bur-
den contemplated in the instrument.186
After focusing on the parties' intent and attendant circum-
stances in determining the transferability of commercial easements
in gross, the courts should apply the same approach to noncom-
mercial easements in gross. Judicial scrutiny of the parties' intent
and the attendant circumstances would act as a safeguard by
preventing transferability of noncommercial rights if the transfer
would burden the servient owner's land beyond the contemplation
of the original parties. The development of a more realistic ap-
proach to divisibility in the commercial context illustrates the ca-
pacity for change. At least one legislature has taken a step toward
free transferability. 187 Courts also should also recognize this capac-
ity for change and examine the parties' intent and attendant cir-
cumstances when determining the transferability and divisibility of
all easements in gross.
183. L. CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 79 (Washington Square Press
ed. 1951).
184. See supra notes 139-68 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 125-38 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 142-62 and accompanying text.




Today, easements in gross continue to play an important com-
mercial role and are finding new uses in fields such as environmen-
tal conservation and historic preservation. Courts, however, still
disagree about whether a holder of an easement in gross may
transfer or divide his interest. The transferability of easements in
gross still is unsettled. Some courts persist in presuming that ease-
ments are appurtenant, rather than in gross, despite the intent of
the parties. This improper presumption has hindered the develop-
ment of the transferability of easements in gross. Other courts
have begun to uphold the transferability of both public and private
commercial easements in gross. These courts, however, are still
hesitant to allow the transfer of noncommercial easements in gross.
Most courts have not yet given controlling weight in questions of
transferability to the intention of the parties. Legislative ap-
proaches have advanced the transferability of easements in gross,
but only for easements for specific uses. The divisibility of ease-
ments in gross, on the other hand, has developed more rapidly.
The eclipse of the "one stock" rule in favor of the original burden
notion was important in this development. The intent of the par-
ties plays an important role in determining whether an easement is
divisibile. If the law in this area is to continue to develop in a posi-
tive direction, courts must be willing to place less emphasis on ter-
minology and to direct more attention toward the parties' inten-
tions and surrounding circumstances of the easement interest
when determining both the transferability and divisibility of ease-
ments in gross.
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